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1. Introduction 
 
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) involves deep structural 
adjustments that will certainly change the competitiv  position of countries and 
regions. It is a challenging project that entails opp rtunities and risks for current as 
well as new members. It is expected that the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) will experience both the highest risks and the largest benefits, as a result of 
the singularity of their economic and social structures in relation to EU patterns. 
Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have been identified as key elements 
for economic integration. They have been playing a crucial role in the transition and 
economic convergence processes and will continue to be paramount for the 
foreseeable future.  
Since the beginning of the transition process, profound economic, political and 
social changes have occurred in the CEEC. After the collapse of centrally planned 
economic regimes, and over the past decade, a progressively deeper liberalisation of 
markets has been taking place. The European Agreements and the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreements have also contributed to these countries’ reforms. Overall, 
considerable progress in transposing the acquis communautaire has been achieved 
and a high degree of implementation has been accomplished in many areas, such as in 
the internal market. Considerable tariff reduction has taken place and the main trade 
barriers have been dismantled. As a consequence, trade liberalisation is already a 
reality in almost all sectors and countries involved, which coincided with a trade 
reorientation towards the EU. 
FDI has been assuming a key role in the CEEC’ catching up process, not only 
because of its importance in overcoming inefficiencs in the local financial markets, 
but also because it is a fast way of transferring technology and market-oriented 
business culture to previously centrally controlled economies. For both reasons, FDI 
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contributed to the strategic restructuring of firms and to the transformation of the 
CEEC’ export structures.   
In what follows, trade and FDI relations between the EU and the CEEC are 
analysed, focusing on the major changes that have been occurring in the eve of 
enlargement. Furthermore, we will try to assess future developments, by identifying 
the challenges ahead and discussing the policies to be adopted. 
2. The Dynamics of EU-CEEC Trade Relations 
Following the disintegration of the centrally planned economic regimes, there was a 
fast and extensive integration of the CEEC into the world markets, with the degree of 
openness, measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, increasing from 56% 
in 1993 to 80% in 2001. Trade relations with the EUhave sharply increased, but are 
more intense with neighbouring countries. In fact, Germany is the CEEC’ main 
trading partner, representing more than 40% of the EU-CEEC trade, followed by 
Austria and Italy. The progressive reorientation of CEEC' economies towards the EU 
coincided with a decline in their relationships with the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance members (COMECON). In 2001, the percentag  of the CEEC' external 
trade with the EU was around 65%, comparable to that of most EU members.  
The expansion of EU-CEEC trade relations contributed significantly to the 
deterioration of the CEEC’ trade deficits. Indeed, in spite of the efforts to overcome 
such a trend, these countries still display high structural trade imbalances. Moreover, 
the catching-up process is expected to induce higher deficits in some cases. This is 
hardly surprising. During the Southern enlargements the new members’ trade deficits 
also generally worsened after joining the European Community. High levels of 
investment are necessary to achieve economic modernisation, requiring a higher level 
of imports, mainly of equipment and capital goods. Furthermore, with the expansion 
of real incomes, imports of more sophisticated consumption goods will naturally 
increase. On the other hand, given past developments, a  export boom in the Eastern 
countries is unlikely to occur in the coming years.  
Trends in current account deficits vary across the new member states. A 
significant reduction of such deficits highly depends on the rate of convergence and of 
industrial restructuring. Therefore, it is expected that those countries that have 
engaged in more profound reforms of industrial structures, and present a higher 
convergence in productivity levels, will be in a better position to reduce their deficits. 
However, given the relatively small economic dimensio  of some of these countries, 
bulky investments may also induce a reduction of deficits. Accordingly, the European 
Commission (2003) predicts that, by 2006, Estonia and the Slovak Republic will 
experience sizeable improvements in their current accounts. 
Given the increase in EU-CEEC trade relations, one key aspect to assess is 
whether the trade potential between the EU and the CEEC has already been 
exhausted. Although the empirical literature has not been unanimous, more recent 
results seem to suggest that, in the short term and for most countries, trade is either 
close or even above potential levels (Nielson, 2000; Caetano et al, 2002). However, 
the results also reveal that exports to the CEEC have converged more quickly than 
imports from the CEEC. As a consequence, there is still a gap between actual and 
potential imports from some Eastern countries.  
The CEEC’ permanent economic transformations makes it difficult to predict 
with confidence the long run trade potential. Yet, in spite of the great expansion in 
EU-CEEC trade relations, the volume of trade is expected to continue to rise due to 
the progress in market reforms and to the increase of r al incomes. In addition to 
accession to the EU, CEEC’ adhesion to the Euro-zone will also have positive effects 
on trade flows.  
Gains and losses from trade expansion will not be evenly distributed across 
countries and regions, nor across industrial sectors. Considering the effects of trade 
creation and trade diversion, empirical evidence suggests that the CEEC that are 
geographically and economically closer to the EU are the main beneficiaries of trade 
creation but, simultaneously, are the most affected by trade diversion. The new 
members sharing a common border with the EU have a pattern of exports that is 
similar to the one of incumbent members and, therefore, are in a good position to gain 
market shares from EU countries. Meanwhile, these countries also represent the best 
markets for EU exports and are very exposed to the competition from European firms. 
On the other hand, the exports’ dimension and structu e of the Baltic and Balkan 
countries will limit their competitiveness in EU markets.  
In the EU, the members potentially more affected by CEEC competition are 
also those which will benefit the most from the integration of Eastern domestic 
markets into the Single European Market. In contrast, the countries that will benefit 
the least will also be the less affected by the increasing competition. Portugal is an 
exceptional case due to its exports profile and geographical location. Indeed, the 
country does not have the conditions to gain substantial market shares in the markets 
of the new members. Furthermore, it may be affected by CEEC’ competition in the 
access to EU markets, resulting in a significant trade diversion. 
The liberalisation process in the CEEC changed the economic structures and, 
consequently, the trade flows and the respective specialisation patterns, reflecting the 
changes in the relative prices of goods and factors. This process benefited some 
sectors more than others. Over the last decade, CEEC’ exports of natural resources 
and labour intensive goods have been gradually reduced and replaced by technology 
and skilled-labour intensive products (see Caetano et al., 2002 and Landesmann, 
2003). However, strong heterogeneity at the country level indicates that geographical 
proximity to the EU core and income convergence stimulates product differentiation 
and trade of R&D and capital intensive goods. In terms of specialisation patterns, 
while some countries maintained a traditional specialisation pattern, based on 
unqualified labour-intensive industries, others registered a progressively higher 
degree of integration in the European-wide production and trade networks, 
intensifying their exports of higher technology products (figure 1). 
 


















Source: CHELEM – CEPII Database; Own Calculations 
 
Referring to the international segmentation of production processes, there is an 
increase in the weight of intermediate products (Parts & Components and semi-
finished goods) in the CEEC trade flows and a declin  in the weight of the other 
products (primary, capital and consumption goods). This trend has changed the 
pattern of comparative advantages, with a decline of comparative advantages in 
primary and final goods and of comparative disadvantages in intermediate products, 
resulting in a fall of inter-sectorial trade. The expansion in trade of intermediate goods 
has coincided with the emergence of a vertical specialisation pattern, which occurs 
when the comparative advantage pattern suffers an inversion along the production 
process in each sector (see figure 2). These facts confirm the progressive and rapid 
entry of the CEEC into the world division of productive processes and add to a better 






Figure 2: IIT Specialisation Pattern between the CEC and EU (1993/ 2001) 
 
Source: COMEXT – EUROSTAT Database; Own Calculations. 
 
In recent years, the relative weight of intra-industry trade (IIT) has increased among 
neighbouring regions, indicating that the international labour division (ILD) is 
















competition/cooperation between Eastern and Western firms, and the industrial 
specialisation pattern of each region, will determine the effects of enlargement on 
trade in the regional context. It is expected that t e impact will be stronger in the 
current EU-CEEC border areas, but dependent on the nature of industrial 
transformations, the level of development of the region and the type of policies 
implemented. 
Additionally, it is important to refer the strong factor complementarity 
between the CEEC and the EU. These two groups of countries still export goods of 
different ranges, with trade in vertically differentiated products having a significant 
share in CEEC-EU trade flows. In spite of evidence of quality upgrading, CEEC’ 
quality levels still lag behind those of the EU, and trade of low quality products 
remains a source of comparative advantages for the CEEC (figure 3). This difference 
in the quality of the exchanged products, corresponding to a significant difference in 
prices, is due to an increasing specialisation in products of distinct quality, based on 
the diverse factorial intensities employed in the productive processes. While the 
technological processes of current members are intensiv  in physical capital, the 
CEEC production processes are more labour intensive, requiring large imports of 
specialised equipment (see Boeri and Brücker, 2000 and Caetano et al, 2002). 
 


















Source: COMEXT – EUROSTAT Database; Own Calculations. 
 
This evolution in the nature and type of trade betwe n countries is highly dependent 
on the behaviour and strategies of multinational companies, through intra-firm trade 
and subcontracting of domestic firms, which have stimulated the segmentation of 
production processes (Kaminski, 2001).  
Since trade in vertically differentiated goods has been increasing in EU-CEEC 
trade relations, a relevant aspect to consider is the effect of foreign exchange rate 
stability. If trade is horizontally differentiated, with similar prices, firms are not able 
to accommodate price variations, thus becoming sensitive to foreign exchange 
volatility. On the contrary, if trade is vertically differentiated, firms have some market 
power and are therefore better prepared to face foreign exchange volatility. As the 
empirical evidence suggests, foreign exchange volatility has a more negative impact 
upon investment in countries with a high degree of openness, a high level of 
integration in the international processes of production, and a high relative proportion 
of IIT in similar products (Guérin and Lahréche-Révil, 2001). Accordingly, it is likely 
that, in those CEEC displaying higher values for these variables, foreign exchange 
stability will exert favourable effects on investment, trade, and welfare. 
 
3. The Role of FDI in Economic Restructuring  
 
FDI provides funding for projects which would otherwise not find domestic financing. 
It is recognised as a simple and quick way of transferring business culture and 
technology to developing regions, performing a pivotal role in the transition process 
of the former centrally planned economies. In the early nineties, FDI flows to the 
CEEC were relatively insignificant in global terms. The turning year was 1995 and, 
since then, FDI growth has been considerable and cotinuous (figure 4). The CEEC 
have even been an exception in the worldwide declin of FDI since 2001, continuing 
to attract increasing volumes of foreign investment (UNCTAD, 2003). Nevertheless, 
CEEC’ FDI stocks, in per capita terms, are still significantly below the EU’s average 
(figure 5), suggesting a continuation of the growth trend in the next few years. 
 


































Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
 
FDI projects in the CEEC are very heterogeneous, differing in terms of magnitude, 
objectives, technology, geographical location, ownership, control structures and 
geographical origin. The EU is, by far, the main source of FDI in these countries, 
followed by the United States. More than three quarters of the capital flows entering 
the region originate in EU member states. Germany is the main partner in terms of 










Figure 5: CEEC and Southern cohesion countries’ FDI stock (2001) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on International Financi l Statistics 
(IMF) and UNCTAD (2003). 
 
 
On the part of the capital suppliers, a variety of motivations influence an 
entrepreneur’s decision to invest abroad, following the optimum management 
strategies of multinational corporations. The underlying fundamentals behind FDI 
flows and the reasons for some locations’ higher attractiveness have been extensively 
studied, both theoretically and empirically (see, for instance, Brenton and Di Mauro, 
1999, Caetano et al., 2002 and Deichmann et al., 2003). In the process of European 
integration, the perceived reduction of overall risk in the integrated area has been a 
key aspect, as FDI increased in the new members after every previous enlargement 
process.  
The empirical evidence suggests that spatial proximity and specific economic 
characteristics attract FDI to Eastern locations (Caetano et al., 2002 and Deichman et 
al., 2003). Trade and FDI flows concentrate in the bordering countries, with Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, three of the most developed economies, receiving 
around two thirds of the FDI in the CEEC. Apart from confirming the importance of 
geographic location, it should also be stressed that these are also the countries that 
have been more successful in reforming, deregulating, a d opening their economies. 
In addition, host country characteristics, such as its economic dimension, potential 
demand, openness to world trade, and lower relative labour compensation levels 
(wages plus supplementary benefits) add up to the list of main FDI determinants. 
According to these results, peripheral countries, such as Portugal, may have severe 
disadvantages in attracting and maintaining foreign investment, not only because of 
geographical distance, but also due to weak potential demand and low purchasing 
power. Investors engaged in market-seeking FDI may become less interested in these 
countries. Efficiency-seeking investors, though, may continue to seek these locations 
as long as the labour force remains relatively cheap.  
The gap in unit labour costs between the new and the incumbent EU members 
is expected to narrow, thus reducing CEEC’ attractiveness from the cost efficiency 
point of view. Furthermore, all EU members will face the competition of non-member 
CEEC, who will try to attract efficiency-seeking FDI in the new ‘frontier countries’. It 
should be noted, however, that market potential is expected to increase in the new 
members, due to GDP growth and the consequent reduction in the economic distance 
that separates them from the EU average standards. Changes may also be anticipated 
in the type of FDI directed to the CEEC, as the catching-up process will probably 
enhance investments by horizontal multinationals and depress investment by vertical 
multinationals (Carstensen and Toubal, 2003). 
The dynamics of FDI flows is expected to promote economic growth in the 
CEEC, especially due to capital accumulation and the renewal of capital stocks. 
Besides the positive effects upon restructuring, there are also impacts on the 
productivity, export performance, product quality and costs. In some successfully 
restructured sectors, where foreign investors have improved productivity and provided 
access to foreign markets, cost benefits have been above average and continue to 
improve (Hunya, 2002, and Havlik, 2003). However, there are concerns that 
economic growth in some Southern EU countries may be negatively affected, due to a 
diversion effect or to a crowding-out effect. Though results from previous work do 
not display evidence of FDI diversion until recent years (Boeri and Brücker, 2000, 
Buch et al, 2003, and Galego et al., 2004), specific sectors and regions may become 
affected. Among these are the border regions in Germany and Austria, but also some 
regions in cohesion countries, highly dependent on the performance of specific sectors 
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(1) dynamic products=  products with the highest rate of gr wth in the EU 
imports 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on International Financi l Statistics (IMF), 
UNCTAD (2003) and CHELEM. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider the relationship between FDI and the trade 
dynamics. Exports structures reflect changes in a country’s specialisation pattern and, 
naturally, the reorientation of exports towards products intensive in technology and 
qualified labour.  The CEEC that have attracted larger amounts of FDI are those that 
have better adjusted to the dynamics of the EU imports. In fact, as can be seen in 
figure 6, countries with higher stocks of FDI per capita display a bigger share in their 
exports of products with the highest rate of growth in the EU imports. Therefore, there 
appears to be a link between high volumes of FDI and the reshaping of specialisation 
patterns. These countries have speeded up the process of transformation of trade 
structures and improved their qualitative competitive position. Moreover, the 
structural changes in trade composition were consolidated by increasing shares of IIT 
in total trade, particularly in the countries receiving the highest amounts of FDI. 
   
4. The Challenges Ahead 
 
The CEEC’ accession to the EU will reinforce the integration process. It has already 
brought increasing opportunities and is expected to keep on generating benefits for 
economic agents in both new and incumbent member states. Nevertheless, it will also 
entail several risks. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the potentially harmful 
effects, and this will require policies aimed at sustaining past convergence trends of 
the new member states, or formulating special financial programs, and implementing 
structural reforms to achieve income convergence between old and new members and 
strengthen cohesion. Furthermore, it is important to correct possible negative impacts 
from trade diversion and FDI reallocation, or from the increasing probability of 
asymmetric shocks. 
Before considering particular regions, countries or groups of countries, it is 
appropriate to focus on the EU’s perspective as a whole. The Single Market might be 
considered the “microeconomic core” of the EU (Brenton, 2002) and the mutual 
recognition principle is a key issue which depends on mutual confidence among 
countries. Distortions may arise after the application of the established standards in 
each country. In addition, negotiations concerning standardisation will also become 
more difficult when 25 countries instead of 15 are involved. Therefore, administrative 
and judicial capability is a fundamental element in the application of mutual 
recognition. Market surveillance and enforcement authorities along with the 
appropriate means of rectification and sanctions are also important.  
The viability of certain firms in the new member states may also be affected 
by the requirement of complying with the acquis, given the substantial investment 
efforts required. The CEEC must harmonize their regim s with the EU regulations, 
not only to guarantee full access to the Single Market and to increase competitiveness, 
but also to benefit the most in terms of investment promotion from the EU regional 
development funds. Financing the transposition of the acquis is exactly one of the 
areas identified by the European Commission (2003) where specific policies will have 
to be introduced after enlargement.  
Non-tariff barriers are at the centre of the discusion on the functioning of the 
Single Market after enlargement. Even though it is expected that such barriers will be 
eliminated in the process of economic integration, t is also plausible that both old and 
new members will try to protect a number of vulnerable sectors, arguing with public 
policy and public security reasons. In fact, different kinds of non-tariff barriers may 
be an important obstacle to trade. Technical barriers are the main impediment to the 
trade of goods and result mainly from the execution of regulatory policies (for 
instance for safety and health reasons) and from voluntary standards adopted by 
domestic industries. In what relates to trade in servic s, the key issues relate to 
differences in regulatory regimes across countries, which seriously limit the ability of 
firms to effectively operate on a European-wide basis. The EU should therefore take 
the necessary steps to prevent abusive behaviour of regulatory measures from all its 
members.  
Most assessments of the impact of enlargement on trade and FDI dynamics, 
for the current and new member states, indicate that the benefits are proportionately 
much larger for the new members. This conclusion is ba ed on the higher weight of 
the EU in CEEC exports, when compared to the weight of the CEEC in EU exports, 
and on the smaller dimension of their economies. Moreover, not only an unequal 
distribution of the benefits between these two groups of countries is expected, but it is 
also likely that differences will arise within both groups.  
In spite of the profound transformations in the intensity and patterns of trade 
between CEEC and EU countries during the transition period, adjustments in trade 
will continue to take place in the medium and long run. First, because of increasing 
investment and production specialization. Second, because there are still specific 
sectors where trade liberalisation remains incomplete (automobile, services, agri-
food). However, on the part of the EU countries, signif cant adjustments in trade are 
not expected and therefore CEEC’ complete integration nto EU markets of 
goods/services and labour should not lead to significa t competitive tensions in these 
countries. Indeed, the impact on EU employment and wages will be reduced due to 
the absence of large-scale competition. The direct effects will be restricted to some 
border regions and producers of similar goods. As for the CEEC, and following the 
developments of the transition period, it is expected that enlargement will promote 
some changes in the production and employment structures, which will affect relative 
factor costs and the distribution of income. The process of labour reallocation from 
the primary sector to services and the transfer from activities based on natural 
resources to those intensive in labour will promote int nse adjustments in labour 
markets. 
Although the major impacts of enlargement will be felt by the CEEC, possible 
trade diversions affecting both the incumbent members and third countries have to be 
taken into account. Indeed, empirical results suggest some degree of similarity 
between EU imports from the CEEC and EU imports from the Southern countries 
(especially in the case of Portugal). This fact has created some fears of higher 
competition after enlargement, confirmed by a gradual convergence in export prices 
between the CEEC and the Southern EU members. This tendency reflects a gradual 
upgrading of the CEEC in terms of the goods’ factor c ntents and factor relative 
prices, as well as on productivity levels1. 
From the beginning of the transition process, the CEE  displayed large 
differentials of factor productivity and product quality when compared to the EU, 
along with strong heterogeneity between the different industries. Since differences 
were more pronounced on more technologically developed sectors, the catching-up 
process has been, and will probably continue to be, more sluggish. It is predictable 
that convergence will be more difficult to achieve in industries requiring more labour 
qualification and demanding a drastic progress in organisation and management 
abilities. Given the current situation in the CEEC, the process of convergence will 
require high growth rates on factorial productivity and product quality in these 
countries. 
It is important to make a distinction between growth potential and growth 
feasibility, as economic expansion will depend on the institutional environment and 
on the behaviour of the agents in each country. Indeed, a wide diversity of patterns of 
industrial convergence may coexist in the future, implying that the comparative 
advantages’ dynamics of the different countries may present quite distinct patterns, 
determined by the timing of switchovers of the industries’ comparative costs. 
Therefore, the CEEC face rather distinct situations in terms of economic 
convergence with the old EU members. In fact, each country’s position depends not 
only on the quality and extent of the structural trnsformations achieved so far, but 
also on the country’s position within the intra-European trade networks (Radosevic, 
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2003). Subsequently, the catching-up trajectories will reflect each country’s ability to 
undertake the structural adjustments necessary for its integration into the common 
markets and will determine its participation in theeconomic structures of the enlarged 
union. 
One other significant aspect to consider is the trade dynamics among the 
CEEC.  As tariff barriers amongst the new member state  will be abolished by EU 
membership, it is likely that changes in intra-CEEC trade dynamics and structures 
will occur. During the first years of the CEEC’ economic transition, there was a 
remarkable decrease in intra-CEEC trade, together with a redirection of trade towards 
the EU. However, especially since 1994, there has been evidence of increasing 
dynamics in intra-CEEC trade, which has been more significant than the one observed 
in EU-CEEC trade. From a geographical point of view, this has not been a 
homogeneous process. In fact, according to Boillot et al. (2003), trade flows became 
particularly intensive inside three sub-regions: the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania), the countries of Eastern Europe (Romania and Bulgaria) and those of 
Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia).  
This intra-regional trade dynamism is not only driven by geographical 
proximity and by historical links, but can be seen mostly as a consequence of 
industrial location strategies of Western companies, which has led to the emergence 
of flows within sectors, between countries of the same sub-region. Multinational 
companies try to take advantage of geographic and economic proximity and have 
established strategic positions in these emergent markets. They also intend to exploit 
the benefits of agglomeration and of the related scale economies and have structured 
more competitive clusters which cross CEEC national borders. Accordingly, 
following the CEEC’ effective integration into the EU, a process similar to that which 
took place when Portugal and Spain became community members is likely to occur. 
In that case, bilateral trade between these two countries, which was mainly driven by 
multinational companies’ activities, increased at a substantially higher rate than trade 
with their EU partners (Caetano, 1998). Consequently, it might be expected that the 
CEEC will keep up the EU tendency to increase intra-regional trade flows, and that 
intra-CEEC trade will grow faster than that between the EU and the CEEC. 
Given that both the intra-CEEC trade and the EU-CEE trade are expected to 
rise, the flows with third parties may become affected. In fact, some incoming nations 
have specific trade interests with non-member countries that will require special 
authorisation from the EU in order to maintain previously established trade 
agreements. Although the EU will probably reject such requests, it will be under 
pressure to improve trade and economic relations with the former COMECON 
countries. Specific cases will have to be assessed. The EU must adjust its interests in 
trade negotiations to those of the new members, following what occurred in previous 
enlargements. In the current case, such behaviour on the part of the EU may also 
simplify the process of future membership for some of the new members’ trading 
partners. The adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET) by new members may 
create additional competitiveness problems, as for m st industrial goods the CET is 
lower than these countries’ tariffs towards third countries. In order to overcome the 
challenges of a more competitive environment, domestic firms must correctly identify 
their weaknesses and be supported in their upgrading efforts. This requires a quick 
development of new members’ financial systems and support infrastructures.  
In terms of FDI, even though most empirical assessmnts find no evidence of 
FDI diversion from the EU periphery to the CEEC, such conclusion is probably due to 
the fact that the work published so far is based on data sets that end before 2001. 
However, a closer analysis of the determinants of FDI in Eastern locations 
(geographical proximity to the EU core, low labour costs and high potential demand) 
and a careful examination of FDI stocks’ figures in the last two years suggests that the 
hypothesis of FDI diversion is plausible, particularly when individual regions and 
specific sectors are considered, instead of countries. Since services are mainly locally 
supplied, FDI reallocation is more likely in the manufacturing sector, which is the 
main FDI receiver sector in the CEEC. 
It is reasonable to anticipate that the positive expectations related to the 
CEEC’ long-run catch-up trend, the future abolition f foreign exchange-rate 
uncertainty within the EU, or the lower institutional and political risks will foster both 
intra-industry trade and FDI in the newly integrated area. FDI will probably be the 
more positively influenced, as the perceived more secure economic environment will 
be translated into lower risk premia demanded by foreign investors. In addition, even 
though there is the need for FDI regimes to comply with EU regulations, and 
therefore to give up some existent special incentivs to attract foreign investors, 
several CEEC might improve international competitiveness by lowering corporate 
taxes below the EU average (UNCTAD, 2003). The case of Ireland is interesting in 
this respect, as the country became a strong attractor of FDI and displays corporate 
taxes that are below the EU and CEEC averages (Frasquilho, 2002). However, in the 
CEEC, tax competition may become incompatible with the need to improve 
infrastructures, especially in the context of the fiscal discipline imposed by EMU. 
A particular feature of the EU enlargement is the redirection of the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds away from the incumbents to the new members, mainly at the 
expense of Ireland and Portugal. The aim is to promote the catching-up process in the 
CEEC, allowing the development of infrastructures which may make the CEEC more 
attractive to foreign investors. Simulations in Breuss et al. (2003), based on the 
Agenda 2000, show that the reallocation of funds could divert FDI by five to seven 
percentage points from current to new EU members in the short-term, or even more 
after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. 
In spite of the trend that is currently observable, th re are reasons to believe 
that sustaining the current levels of FDI inflows to the CEEC might not be possible in 
the future. First, the adoption of the acquis communautaire nforces stricter labour 
and environmental regulations, probably increasing production costs. In addition, EU 
competition policy does not generally allow public subsidies or tax relief favouring 
foreign investors (Dauderstädt, 2003). Second, the tendency toward price convergence 
and the Balassa-Samuelson effect will contribute to an increase in new members’ 
wages and other production costs. However, this effect could at least be partially 
offset by productivity and by income growth. Third, a real appreciation of domestic 
currencies may occur following large capital inflows and higher inflation. Fourth, the 
gradual exhaustion of privatisation processes, a major FDI attractor, will require more 
greenfield investments in order to compensate for such a downward pressure. Finally, 
FDI stocks in these countries are reaching the EU average, suggesting that some 
equilibrium level may soon be achieved, reversing the current trend and repeating the 
course of events in all previous EU enlargement processes. 
Overall, considering all the above mentioned factors, it may be anticipated 
that, although in the short run high volumes of FDI may continue to flow to the 
CEEC, eventually diverted from the old Southern EU members, a reversal is expected 
in the near future. The main immediate beneficiaries from such phenomenon may be 
the new Eastern EU neighbours, now already offering lower wages and similar 
education levels. Among the new competitors is the group that is expected to join the 
EU in the next enlargement - Bulgaria and Romania - but also other Eastern countries 
such as Ukraine. In the manufacturing sector, for example, wages in Poland are 
already five to six times above those in Ukraine, an incentive for firms to move across 
the border and further East. 
Under these circumstances, there is a need for specific policies to attract FDI 
in the more vulnerable new and incumbent members, which are likely to suffer 
idiosyncratic shocks. More selective promotion strategies should be implemented, 
favouring high technology and export-oriented activities. Efforts should be made to 
implement structural reforms capable of generating the necessary conditions to attract 
market-seeking FDI and upgrade the demand for effici ncy-seeking projects. National 
policies should be conceived to exploit positive externalities produced by FDI flows, 
namely in productivity, employment, technology transfers and human capital 
development. On the one hand, negotiations with social partners will be essential to 
achieve a sustainable development. On the other hand, current technology gaps have 
to be identified. If such gaps are very pronounced, the technology transfer process 
between local and multinational companies will be compromised and situations of 
oligopoly, or even monopoly, may occur. There is stll pace for further restructuring 
of domestic firms, despite the structural changes already promoted by FDI. 
Furthermore, policy makers should promote the development of local innovative 
firms’ clusters and of other alternative ways of generating local synergies. Investment 
in R&D-driven activities and in innovation is a strategy that should attract FDI with 
high technological content, which is precisely the more desirable from the host 
country point of view.  
At the same time, there is the need for an efficient system of financial 
intermediation. Flexible and quick ways to find funds for entrepreneurial activities 
and easily available risk capital are important to s rengthen the entrepreneurial 
environment. In spite of the remarkable progress already achieved with the 
privatisation of the large state banks and the entry i o the financial sector of EU and 
USA strategic investors, further reforms towards the restructuring of the financial 
system and its regulatory environment should not be neglected. This is particularly 
important given the urgent need to address the problem of the escalating current 
account deficits in most CEEC, reflecting the convergence process. This entails non-
negligible risks for these countries’ financial stability, as the Asian experience 
demonstrates, given the possibility of sudden reversals of capital inflows. Current 
accounts have been largely financed by FDI, which is considered to be less harmful 
than short-term capital. However, given its expected r versal in the near future, as 
noted above, the relative importance of FDI inflows may be replaced by riskier 
portfolio investments, as external investors gain co fidence with EU accession and try 
to explore short-term gains. It is therefore prudent to maintain current account deficits 
within sound limits, to prevent the risks of sudden capital reversals. 
One remaining question is related to the timing of the euro adoption on the 
part of new members. From the commercial point of view, there appears to be no need 
for an immediate entry into EMU. However, given the rapid structural changes in 
trade patterns that occurred during the transition period and the growing importance 
of foreign investment, the adoption of the common currency seems to be inevitable. In 
fact, the euro may contribute to strengthening the credibility of the ongoing industrial 
restructuring processes, and may have positive effects upon the new division of labour 
on the European scale. Notwithstanding this, the int gration into EMU will bring 
additional challenges for new member states, in terms of economic growth and 
employment, which inevitably will affect trade and FDI. In this respect, the 
difficulties in complying with the Stability and Growth Pact currently felt by some 
members are a hint of what the future may entail for new members. 
 
5. Final Remarks 
 
EU membership will promote a broader market liberalisation and a higher level of 
economic and monetary stability in the CEEC. The new competitive environment will 
reinforce the role of the market as a mechanism of ec nomic adjustment and promote 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, th  current processes of industrial 
and entrepreneurial restructuring, and the geographic l reorientation of trade patterns, 
in the countries involved, will be reinforced. In such a context, the dynamics of trade 
flows and of foreign investments, along with the strengthening of other forms of 
entrepreneurial cooperation, are the most visible channels of economic and 
technological integration of the two European areas. Nevertheless, the empirical 
studies developed so far suggest that the resulting economic benefits have not been 
evenly distributed at the geographical or at the sectoral levels.  
During the transition process, the dynamics of trade nd FDI flows were 
crucial for the restructuring and modernisation of new members’ economies, thus 
contributing to sustain growth and convergence in the incoming CEEC. Concerning 
trade, profound changes in terms of the intensity, composition and nature of flows 
have been taking place. However, the liberalisation of product and factor movements 
may maintain the structural asymmetries and therefore the heterogeneous distribution 
of benefits and costs. From the mid nineties, an increasing flow of FDI into the CEEC 
has generated positive impacts on industrial restructu ing. In fact, transfers of 
technology and new methods of management have improved competitiveness and the 
access to international markets. CEEC’ technological progress and economic 
openness have contributed to a new international labour division, via production and 
distribution networks that involve Eastern and Western European firms.  
In the context of enlargement, the greater risks are related to the fact that such 
dynamics, upon which the internationalisation of the Eastern emergent economies was 
based, may not be sustainable in the long run. Regarding external investment, it is 
recognised that foreign firms, stimulated by the privatisation processes and by the 
prospects of EU enlargement, gradually took positions in CEEC’ markets, substituting 
in a way for the scarcity of domestic funds. FDI flows were also a compensation for 
the increasing current account deficits. In some countries, however, the inflow of FDI 
has already slowed down and, in cases such as that of Poland, has declined, thus 
raising concerns about future developments. 
The dynamics of CEEC exports in the last decade, which in real terms grew 
more than 10% per year, was one of the main sources of conomic growth in these 
countries. Exports’ competitiveness was based, among other factors, on low labour 
costs and on a skilled labour force, on favourable exchange rates and on the re-
discovery of the near and large EU markets. FDI played an important role in this 
process, as shown by the participation of foreign frms in CEEC’ trade structures and 
also by the geographical and sectoral reorientation of exports. The institutional 
environment promoted by the European Agreements and by the Outward Processing 
Trade regimes also supported such dynamics. However, there are already signs that 
the rate of growth of exports to the EU is decreasing. 
Summing up, in the future, the greatest risk is related to the mounting signs of 
partial exhaustion of this growth model. Furthermore, given the evident differences in 
terms of economic performance and in the degree of internationalisation of domestic 
and foreign firms in the CEEC, social tensions and regional asymmetries are 
increasing. Probably the enlargement in itself will not alter recent trends in a 
significant way, so that growth sustainability in the near future should rely on the 
dynamics of domestic economies and on processes of economic adjustment. The 
incentives to increase domestic saving and to modernise and internationalise domestic 
firms are the most important challenges to the success of enlargement, since they 
determine both the rhythm of convergence towards the EU and the balance of current 
accounts. Appropriate economic policies and EU financi l support for the 
modernisation of infrastructures will undoubtedly help to achieve those goals. 
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